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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Malcolm Cornelius Mack appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to
suppress evidence discovered during a traffic stop. Mr. Mack claims the officer violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully prolonging the stop, first by making inquiries about
drug trafficking activity, and then later, by conducting a dog sniff. The evidence should have
been suppressed and the district court's order should be reversed.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing. 1 Idaho State Police
Officer Christopher Cottrell was patrolling a stretch of Interstate 84 in Canyon County,
accompanied by his drug dog. (R., p.110.) Mr. Mack and his uncle, Oscar Caldwell, were
traveling along that stretch in a Lexus sedan bearing Alaska license plates. (R., p.111.) Officer
Cottrell decided to stop the Lexus for two traffic violations: excessively tinted windows; and
following too closely behind a commercial vehicle.

(R., pp.110-11; Tr., p.7, Ls.8-18; Ex.,

atl :05.) After stopping the Lexus, the officer walked up to the vehicle and made contact with the
occupants. (R., p.111; Ex., at 1:00-1 :53.) Officer Cottrell explained the two traffic violations as
the reasons for the stop and asked the driver for his license, the vehicle's registration, and
insurance documents. (R. p.11; Ex., at 1:15.) Mr. Caldwell, who was the driver, explained that
the car was not his but belonged to his brother in Arkansas.
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(R., p.111; Ex., at 1:30.)

Officer Cottrell testified at the hearing, and the video recordings from his on-dash camera and
on-body microphone was admitted as State's Exhibit 1, and played at the hearing. (Tr., p.19,
Ls.2-10.) Citations to "Ex." refer to the copy of the exhibit that was filed with this Court on
January 13, 2020. The district court also considered the "Affidavit" of Mr. Mack that was filed
with his suppression motion. (R., pp.61, 110.) No other video or documentary evidence was
offered or admitted, and the district court does not appear to have relied on other evidence in
denying the motion to suppress. (See generally Tr., p.4, L.2 -p.76, .14; R., pp.110-121.)

1

Mr. Caldwell ("the driver") produced his Arkansas driver's license from his wallet. (R., p.111;
Ex., at 1:20-3:40, 21: 15.) In response to the officer's questions, the driver explained that he had
just flown to Washington to bring the car back to his brother in Arkansas; that he had picked the
car up from his sister; and that she lived in Tacoma, Washington. (R., p.111; Ex., at 1:00-4:40.)
The officer asked how the driver was related to Mr. Mack, the driver said he was his nephew.
(R., p.111; Ex., at 1:20-3:40.) Upon being mentioned, Mr. Mack greeted the officer, added that
he had recently moved to Washington, then offered to show his Arkansas ID and handed and it
over to Officer Cottrell. (R., p.111; Ex., at 1:20-3:40.)
During this initial conversation with the occupants, Officer Cottrell observed a large
suitcase with airline luggage tags resting on the backseat and noticed the car had air fresheners
clipped to each vent. (R., p.111; Tr., p.9, Ls.2-7; Ex., at 8:30-8:45.) The officer had also noticed
the driver carried a stack of cash in his wallet. (R., p.111; Ex.,1:20-3:40, 21:15.)
The driver produced the insurance document (see Ex., at 4:40) but had trouble initially
finding the current registration. (R., p.11; Tr., p.28, Ls.16-25; Ex., at 3:15 - 6:30.) The driver
said he had the registration that morning, and with the officer's permission, the driver stepped
out of the Lexus, looked through the passenger compartments and, upon finding the current
registration, handed the registration to Officer Cottrell. (R., p.111; Ex., at 6:30-7:45.)
After obtaining the driver's license, insurance information, and the current vehicle
registration, but before returning to his patrol car to run the license and registration checks,
Officer Cottrell instructed the driver to walk to the front of the patrol car, in front of the dash
cam, and then began a different line of questioning.

(Ex., at 7:45-8:00.) For the next half

minute, Officer Cottrell questioned the driver about the contents of the Lexus. (Ex., at 8:259:07.) Specifically, Officer Cottrell asked whether there was "anything in the vehicle I should be
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concerned about?" and, aside from the vehicle itself, whether "anyone has asked you to drive
anything across state lines?" and whether there was "anything in the trunk that I should be
concerned about?" (Ex., 8:25-8:55.) After that, Officer Cottrell then told the driver, "I happen
to have a drug detection dog - any reason that you can think of that the dog would alert - any
drugs in the vehicle?" (Ex., at 8:40-9:07.)
The driver indicated "no" to all of the officer's questions. (R., p.112; Ex., at 8:25-9:07).
Officer Cottrell later testified he observed the driver's eyes "widen" after he was asked about the
drug dog and that the driver's non-verbal response showed he "had difficulty" answering the
question. (Tr., p.13, L.10.) After that, Officer Cottrell asked the driver about the air fresheners
clipped to the Lexus's air vents. (Ex., at 8:35.) The driver explained the vehicle had been
"sitting up" and he showed the officer debris that had accumulated and was lodged around the
vehicle's fuel door. (R., p.112; Ex., at 8:25-9:00.) Later at the suppression hearing, Officer
Cottrell testified that this series of questions posed to the driver, in front of the patrol car, marked
the beginning of his investigation of interstate drug trafficking. (See Tr., p., 39, Ls.1-14.)

After he finished questioning the driver, Officer Cottrell instructed both the driver and
Mr. Mack to go back to the Lexus and wait, and only then did the officer enter his patrol car and
call dispatch to begin running the license and registration checks. (R., p.111; Ex., 9:20.) After
making that call, dispatch advised the officer to "standby," apparently due to "an emergency
occurring right then." (R., p.111, Ex., at 10:45; Tr., p.11, Ls.11-18.) While standing by for
dispatch, Officer Cottrell measured the Lexus' window tint and determined the tint to be too
dark. (R., p.111; Ex., at 10:45-11:30; Tr., p.11, Ls.11-23.)
When he had completed that task, Officer Cottrell returned to his patrol car and using the
in-car radio phone, again called dispatch to ask to run the license and warrants checks; dispatch
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was ready and accepted the information.

(R., p.112; Ex., at 11 :50-12:45.) After providing

information for both the driver and Mr. Mack, Officer Cottrell did not wait on a return from
dispatch. Instead, Officer Cottrell ended his call by telling dispatch, "I'll be out on canine at this
point [inaudible]" and hung up. (Ex., at 13:35.)2
After ending his call with dispatch, Officer Cottrell retrieved his drug dog from the patrol
car and walked to the Lexus to conduct an exterior "sniff' of the vehicle. (R., p.112; Ex., at
13:35-14:20.) The dog alerted on the open front passenger window. (R., p.112; Ex., at 14:20.)
Officer Cottrell returned to his patrol car, and on his way, used his on-body portable radio to call
in the "positive alert" and to ask for backup. (Ex., at 14:35.) Once back inside his patrol car,
Officer Cottrell again called in the positive alert and asked that the alert be logged. (Ex., at
15:33.)

However, there is no video evidence or testimony showing Officer Cottrell asked

dispatch about a return of the license and warrants checks, or that dispatch had ever returned
such results to the officer. (See generally Ex., 13:35 - 25:00; Tr.)
Upon completing the "positive alert" call, Officer Cottrell walked back to the Lexus
where Mr. Mack and the driver were waiting, informed them of the dog's alert, and asked if they
could tell him why. (Ex.17:00-18:00.) Mr. Mack said he had smoked a marijuana "blunt" in the
car earlier that day. (Ex.17:40.) Without requesting or obtaining a warrant, Officer Cottrell
opened the trunk of the Lexus and searched through it, discovering cash and several pounds of
marijuana. (R., p.112; Ex., at 21:30.)
Based on the evidence discovered during the stop, State charged Mr. Mack with
trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.IO, 38.) Mr. Mack filed a motion to suppress, together with an
Affidavit and supporting memorandum, arguing that Officer Cottrell violated his Fourth

2

This fact is established by the video is omitted in the district court's written findings of fact.
(See generally R., pp.110-20.)
4

Amendment rights, as set forth in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), and State v.

Linze, 161 Idaho 605 (2016), by unlawfully prolonging the traffic stop without reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle's occupants were engaged in any crime. (R., pp.101-03.) He argued
the officer "lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct an investigation into possible
drug crimes." (R., p.79.)

Included with his motion, Mack claimed that Officer Cottrell

unlawfully extended the stop by continuing to talk with the occupants instead of verifying their
identities and Mr. Caldwell's driving status, or beginning the citation process, and then by using
the drug dog. (R., pp.61, 63.) Mr. Mack alternatively argued that the drug dog's alert at the
passenger window did not provide probable cause for the officer to search the trunk. 3 (R., pp.59,
66, 82-86.)
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued its memorandum
decision and order denying Mr. Mack's motion. (R., pp.110-22.) The district court concluded
there was no unlawful prolonging of the stop, finding (1) the officer conducted the drug dog sniff
''while he was waiting for a return from dispatch"; and alternatively, (2) the drug dog sniff was
supported by the officer's reasonable suspicion that drugs were in the car. (R., pp.117-20.)
However, the district court did not address Mr. Mack's argument that Officer Cottrell had
extended the traffic stop, prior to contacting dispatch, by engaging in questioning unrelated to the
purpose of the stop. (See generally R., pp.117-20.)
The district court also concluded that the dog's alert on the passenger window provided
the requisite probable cause to search any compartment, including the trunk. (R., pp.120-22.)
Mr. Mack entered a conditional plea of guilty to marijuana trafficking, expressly
reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.141;

3

Mr. Mack does not raise this issue on appeal.
5

5/15/19 Tr., p.4, L.4 - p.15, L.3.) He was sentenced to a suspended term of five years, with twoyears fixed, and placed on probation. (R., pp.145-47.) He then filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
(R., p.154.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mack's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Mack's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "the tolerable duration of police inquiries

in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission' [which is] to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 353. Where an officer prolongs the duration of a traffic stop by conducting inquiries that
are unrelated to the officer's traffic mission, the officer violates the Fourth Amendment, unless
those additional inquiries are justified by their own reasonable articulable suspicion. Id.; accord

State v. Linze, 161 Idaho at 605. Mr. Mack asserts, as he did in the district court, that Officer
Cottrell violated his Fourth Amendment rights by prolonging the traffic stop to conduct inquiries
unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop; specifically, by questioning the driver about possible
drug trafficking activities, and also by conducting a dog sniff The district court's conclusion
that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged was erroneous, and its order denying suppression
should be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted). Determinations of reasonable suspicion are questions of law and reviewed de novo.

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 790 (1996); State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013).
In conducting that review, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact, unless the
findings are shown to be clearly erroneous. Id. A finding that is unsupported by substantial and
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competent evidence in the record is clearly erroneous and must be set aside. Stuart v. State, 127
Idaho 806, 813-14 (1995); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007).

C.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Find That Officer Cottrell Unlawfully Prolonged
The Traffic Stop
The district court erred as a matter of law and as a matter of fact when it found that

Officer Cottrell did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. In fact, Officer Cottrell unlawfully
prolonged the stop on two occasions: first, to question the driver about possible drug trafficking
activity; and second, to conduct a dog sniff.

Contrary to the district court's rulings, but as

demonstrated below, these additional investigations extended the duration of the stop, and
because they were not justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, violated Mr. Mack's
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

1.

The Fourth Amendment's Protections And The Tolerable Duration Of A Traffic
Stop

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." See also Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. Evidence
obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment protections is subject to the exclusionary rule, which
requires the suppression of evidence obtained as a direct result of the illegal seizure, as well as
"fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963);

State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).
"Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 658 (2007) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). "A seizure for a
traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354
(emphasis added).

"[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is
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determined by the seizure's 'mission' - to address the traffic violation that warranted the
stop, and attend to related safety concerns." Id. at 354. In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that, while the Fourth Amendment "tolerated certain unrelated investigations
that did not lengthen the roadside investigation," the
seizure remains lawful only so long as unrelated inquiries do not measurably
extend the duration of the stop. An officer, in other words, may conduct certain
unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But ... he may not do so
in a way that prolongs the stop, absent reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded
to justify detaining an individual.
Id. (emphasis added.)

In seeking to describe the holdings of Rodriguez, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v.
Linze explained:

The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues the
purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related. However,
should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer has that
original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions. Indeed, when an officer
abandons his or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and purposes
initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. This new seizure cannot piggyback on the reasonableness of the original seizure. In other words, unless some
new reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises to justify the seizure's new
purpose, a seized party's Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the original
purpose of the stop is abandoned (unless that abandonment falls within some
established exception).
161 Idaho at 608.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also held that, if an officer makes unrelated inquiries or
investigations, the officer "will inevitably lengthen the time" of the traffic stop. Linze, 161 Idaho
at 608.

Unless the added time is justified by its mvn reasonable suspicion, the prolonging

violates the Fourth Amendment. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).
"This rule is both broad and inflexible. It applies to all extensions of traffic stops including those
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that could reasonably be considered de minimis." Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (citing Rodriguez, 575
U.S. 355 (emphasis added)).
Importantly, in addressing a defendant's claim that his detention was unlawfully
pro longed, "[t ]he burden is on the State to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify was
sufficiently limited both in scope, and duration." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)
(emphasis added); accord State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423 (1995).

2.

The District Court Erred By Concluding That Officer Cottrell Did Not Unlawfully
Prolong The Traffic Stop

The district court provided two alternative rationales for its conclusion that the stop was
not unlawfully prolonged.

First, the district court concluded that Officer Cottrell "did not

abandon the original purpose of the stop and he performed the canine sniff without adding time
to the stop." (R., p.117.)

Second, and alternatively, the district court concluded that "any

extension of the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion that drugs may be in the vehicle."
(R., p.121.) Both of these conclusions are erroneous, since the undisputed evidence in the record
establishes that Officer Cottrell in fact had added time to the stop, by (a) questioning of the
driver after obtaining the driver's license, insurance information, and current registration for the
vehicle, but before asking dispatch to run a license and warrants checks; and later, (b) conducting
a dog sniff. Moreover, and as set forth in subsection (c) below, neither delay was justified by its
own reasonable suspicion.

a.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Find That The Officer Prolonged
The Traffic Stop By Questioning The Driver About Transporting
Contraband

First, the district court erred in failing to find that Officer Cottrell unlawfully prolonged
the stop when he took time to question the driver about possible criminal activity, instead of
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pursumg the tasks related to the traffic investigation. 4

As demonstrated in the State's

uncontested video evidence, Officer Cottrell detoured5 from the mission of the traffic stop when,
after obtaining the driver's license, insurance document, and the vehicle's current registration,

instead of returning to his patrol car to call the information in to dispatch, the officer instead
began an additional line of questioning, wholly unrelated to the traffic infractions for which the
vehicle had been stopped. (Ex., at 8:40-9:07.)
Specifically, Officer Cottrell inquired ( 1) was "anything in the vehicle I should be
concerned about?" (2) "has anyone asked you to driver anything across state lines?" (3)
"anything in the trunk that I should be concerned about?" and, after stating, "I happen to have a
drug detection dog" (4) "any reason that you can think of that the dog would alert - any drugs in
the vehicle?" (Ex., at 8:40-9:07.)
Although there is no factual finding by the district court as to the duration of this
additional questioning, the uncontested video evidence shows it took approximately twentyseven seconds.

(See Ex., at 8:40-9:07.)

The video also demonstrates that this additional

questioning took place after Officer Cottrell was handed the driver's license, proof of insurance,

4

Mr. Mack alleged in his Affidavit, which was attached to his suppression motion and
considered by the district court, that "Officer Cottrell abandoned the reasons for the stop and
extended the stop unnecessarily by failing to verify our identities and Mr. Caldwell's driving
status and by failing to begin to issue Mr. Caldwell a citation." (R., p.63.)
5
There is no constitutionally significant distinction between the terms "detour," "deviation," and
"abandonment." Notably, neither "abandonment" nor "deviate" appear in the majority opinion
in Rodriguez. See 575 U.S. at 354-58. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez employed
the term "detour." Id. But more importantly, Rodriguez holds that an unrelated task that
"prolongs - i.e., adds time to - the stop," even if de minimis, violates the Fourth Amendment.
575 U.S. at 357. The Idaho Supreme Court, in its analysis of Rodriguez, chose the terms
"abandon" and "deviate" - rather than "detour." See Linze, 161 Idaho at 609 (using the terms
"abandon" and "deviate" interchangeably.) However, these various labels, while perhaps
descriptive of the manner or degree of the prolonging, have no constitutional significance, since
even so-called de minimis extensions violate the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
353; Linze, 161 Idaho at 609 n.2.
12

and the current registration for the vehicle (Ex., at 7:45), but before the officer had made any
attempt to call dispatch to run the license checks (Ex., at 9:45). Rather, as established by the
video, instead of calling dispatch to begin the license and warrants checks, Officer Cottrell first
took time to make inquiries into possible interstate criminal activity. (Ex., at 7:45-9:45.) The
questions were unrelated to the officer's traffic mission, as they lacked any connection to
roadway safety or officer safety. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. Officer Cottrell, himself,
testified that his questioning of the driver, at this point in the stop, marked the beginning of his
investigation into interstate drug trafficking. (See Tr., p., 39, Ls.1-14.) Thus, the officer's own
statements make clear that this additional questioning was not related to the traffic violations that
justified the initial stop but was instead aimed at detecting and investigating interstate drug
trafficking activity. (Tr., p., 39, Ls.1-14.)
Moreover, Officer Cottrell's additional inquiries necessarily prolonged - i.e., added time
to - the duration of the stop, since, at the moment he began that interrogation, the officer had
already obtained the requisite driver and vehicle information, but had not yet attempted to make
any call to dispatch. Compare State v. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding there
was no "time added" by officer's unrelated inquiries made while driver was searching for proof
of insurance, or officer's call for canine assistance while walking to his patrol car to generate
citation ticket); State v. McGraw, 163 Idaho 736 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding that no "added time"
by dog sniff where a second officer had undertaken duties related to the traffic stop before the
sniff occurred.)
As the Idaho Supreme Court held in Linze,
a deviation from the original purpose of a traffic stop will inevitably lengthen the
time needed to complete the original purpose of the seizure, and, accordingly, will
result in a stop that exceeds the time needed to handle the matter for which the
stop was made [and] the timing of an officer's departure from the original
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purpose of the seizure is irrelevant, it only matters that the officer departed from
that purpose.
161 Idaho at 608 (internal brackets and quote marks omitted). 6
Under the holding of Rodriguez, as correctly interpreted by Linze, Officer Cottrell's
departure from the stop's traffic mission to conduct the unrelated inquiries concerning possible
other crimes prolonged the duration of the traffic stop. See id. Therefore, unless justified by its
own reasonable suspicion, the officer's conduct violated Mr. Mack's Fourth Amendment rights.

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 358; Linze, 161 Idaho at 609. The question then is whether Officer

Cottrell possessed a sufficient factual basis to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
at the time he extended the stop.

The State bore the burden of demonstrating reasonable

suspicion, and as explained in subsection (c), below, the State failed to carry that burden.
b.

Officer Cottrell Again Detoured From The Mission Of The Traffic Stop
When, After Calling Dispatch With The Information To Run The License
And Warrants Checks, The Officer Suspended His Traffic Mission And
Instead Conducted A Dog Sniff; The District Court's Findings Are
Legally And Factually Erroneous

Officer Cottrell prolonged the stop a second time by suspending the radio communication
with dispatch conduct a drug dog sniff
Even if Officer Cottrell had not unlawfully extended the stop when he detoured from his
traffic mission to question the driver about criminal activity while standing in front of the patrol
car, the officer unlawfully extended the stop when, after calling in the occupants' information

6

The Court explicitly held that "this interpretation of Rodriguez is correct. Linze, at 609. The
Court flatly rejected the State's suggested interpretation "that Rodriguez allows a seizing
officer to deviate from the purpose of a traffic stop up until the time at which the stop should
have been reasonably completed," concluding that such interpretation "cannot be reconciled
with the United States Supreme Court's analysis." Id.
14

into dispatch, he advised the dispatch officer, "I'll be out on canine at this point [inaudible]"
(Ex., at 13:35), then left his patrol car and did just that.
The district court made the factual findings that,
after the sniff was complete, the officer took [the dog] back to his patrol car and
checked on the status of the return from dispatch. Dispatch had completed the
return. The car registration was accurate and neither occupant was "wanted" by
law enforcement.
(R., p.112.) Based on these factual findings, the district court went on to rule that, "the drug dog
sniff was completed before all of the tasks typically incident to a traffic stop were, or reasonably
should have been, complete." (R., p.117 (emphasis added).) The district court also made a
finding that the officer had "performed the canine sniff while he was waiting for a return from
dispatch." (R., p.117 (emphasis added)); see also R., p.112 ("While he was waiting on a return
from dispatch, the officer exited his patrol car, removed his canine, Dax, and performed an
exterior sniff of the vehicle.") However, as demonstrated below, these factual findings are not
supported by the evidentiary record and are clearly erroneous.
First, there is no evidence showing that Officer Cottrell ever checked on the status of the
return from dispatch.

(See generally, Tr.)

Officer Cottrell testified that he did not recall

receiving a return from dispatch regarding the registration information; rather, he had confirmed
"the registration with the plate - the registration provided with the plate." (Tr., p.42, Ls.16-25.)
Although Officer Cottrell did testify he "had not received a return from dispatch when the dog
was deployed and gave an active alert" (Tr., p.17, Ls.1-9), Officer Cottrell gave no indication
that he had ever checked on the status of the return from dispatch, or that dispatch had ever
completed the license and registration return. (See generally Tr.)
What the evidence shows, specifically in the State's video, is that upon calling in the
license and registration information, Officer Cottrell ended the call by stating, "I'll be out on
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canine at this point [inaudible]." (Ex., at 13:35.) Officer Cottrell then retrieved his drug dog and
performed an exterior sniff of the vehicle, and after the dog alerted, used his portable on-body
radio to call dispatch with the "positive alert" and to ask for backup. (Ex., 14:35.) Once back
inside his patrol car, Officer Cottrell again called in the positive alert and asked that the alert be
logged. (Ex., 15:33.) However, a review of the State's video contains no indication that Officer
Cottrell ever checked on the returns from dispatch; nor is there any indication that dispatch
returned any results for license and warrants checks. (See generally Ex., 13:35 - 25:00.)
Given the evidentiary record, the district court's factual findings that, "the drug dog sniff
was completed before all of the tasks typically incident to a traffic stop were, or reasonably
should have been, complete," and that the officer "performed the canine sniff while he was
waiting for a return from dispatch" are clearly erroneous and must be set aside. Those findings
cannot be used to support the decision of the district court. Stuart, 127 Idaho at 813-14.
c.

The Facts Possessed By Officer Cottrell Were Insufficient To Justify
Prolonging Mr. Mack's Detention

An officer's observations may permit extending the length and scope of a traffic stop, but
only if there exist objective and specific articulable facts that provide the constitutionallyrequired level of "reasonable suspicion" to justify an investigative detention.

Linze. An

investigative detention is permissible only if it is based upon specific articulable facts which
justify suspicion "that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity."

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983).

The quantity and quality of

information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary to establish
probable cause.

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

Still, reasonable suspicion

requires more than a mere hunch. Id. at 329. Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion
is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time
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of the detention. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho
761, 763 (Ct. App. 2016). "Reasonable suspicion depends on the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life." Naverette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014).
Thus, while an experienced policeman, like Officer Cottrell, assigned full-time to a crime
interdiction unit, and tasked with patrolling a "known drug corridor," may regard every traveler
en route from a "source state" with suspicion, and with an eye toward building a case against
him, reasonable suspicion must also take into account "the factual and practical considerations
of every day life." Naverette, 572 U.S. at 402.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated,
Limited investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an
officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about
to commit, a crime. Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable
facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Reasonable
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or "inchoate and unparticularized
susp1c1on.
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
"The 'whole picture' must yield a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a
violation of the law." State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 406 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 441, 418 (1981)). "The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop." State v. Neal, 159 Idaho
439, 443 (2015) (quoting Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112).
As explained below, the behaviors observed by the officer, even in their aggregate, were
not indicative of drug activity or any other criminal conduct and therefore did not justify
extending the stop to conduct a drug investigation. The officer's observations amounted to, at
most, a hunch from an experienced officer, but did not provide the constitutionally-required level
of reasonable suspicion.
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1.

Officer Cottrell Lacked Reasonable Suspicion At The Time He
Extended The Stop To Question The Driver About Interstate
Transportation Of Contraband

The information available to Officer Cottrell when he extended the stop the first time, to
questioning the driver about transportation of possible contraband, was insufficient as a matter of
law to provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the prolonging. 7 According to
the district court, factual findings and legal conclusions found that the facts known or learned by
the officer, were that:
A third party owned the vehicle; the occupants had Arkansas licenses and were
transporting a vehicle with Alaska plates from Washington (a "source" state) to
Arkansas; luggage was in the backseat with an airline tag; one or both occupants
took a one-way flight; the driver advised that he had the registration in hand
earlier that morning; there were air fresheners attached to each air vent, emitting a
very strong odor; the driver had a large billfold of cash in his wallet; the location
of the stop [was] in a federally-designated "High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Area" (HIDTA); the officer's belief that the driver was being evasive; and the
defendant's apparent nervousness.
(R., p.119.)

However, contrary to the district court's conclusion (R., p.121 ), these facts, viewed in the
totality of the circumstances, i.e., the "whole picture," fail to give rise to a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.
In determining whether there is reasonable suspicion, facts are not examined in isolation
but are instead viewed in their totality, and the test is whether "the 'whole picture' must yield a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting a violation of the law." State v. Haworth, I 06
Idaho 405, 406 (1984) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 441, 418 (1981)). While an

7

The officer's observations of the driver - e.g., widened eyes and difficulty answering - after the
officer announced he "happened to have a drug-detection dog" (see Tr., p.13, Ls. I 0), occurred
after the officer had already detoured from his traffic m1ss1on. Those observations can be
considered in the reasonable suspicion analysis.
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officer is not required to believe the driver's statements, he also is not permitted to ignore the
surrounding facts and circumstances.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the fact a vehicle is traveling on a highway
used by drug traffickers or other criminals, specifically Interstate 84, cannot give rise to
reasonable suspicion.

State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2016) ("using the only

interstate freeway available, despite the fact that it may be used by individuals engaged in a
whole host of criminal activity, cannot give rise to reasonable suspicion to search a vehicle as it
would subject thousands of innocent travelers to an invasion of their privacy for no more of a
reason than the use of the road.")
The Lexus did not belong to either party, but was registered to the driver's brother,
Donald Caldwell.

(Tr., p.16, Ls.20-23.)

Officer Cottrell testified that this fact made him

suspicious because a car that belongs to a "third party" is "consistent with" the "drug trafficking
industry." He explained this was indicative of on [sic] the back end for civil forfeiture, the
vehicle not being able to be seized because it does not belong to anybody directly there on the
scene with the crime." (Tr., p.16, Ls.7-15.) However, it is common for family members to share
automobiles, so, like driving on an interstate highway, the fact a motorist is driving his brother's
car should not be a fact that gives rise or contributes to a suspicion that the driver is engaged in
criminal activity.
Officer Cottrell also found it suspicious that the car had an Alaska license plate but
"rather than coming from Alaska" it was "coming from a source state," Washington, headed
down to Arkansas. (Tr., p.16, Ls.16-19.) However, the officer did not articulate why or how this
fact added to his suspicion of criminal activity. (See generally Tr.)
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Officer Cottrell also testified why the suitcase on the backseat added to his suspicion,
explaining that, in his experience,
people will put their luggage in the trunk and then put, you know, travel items like
a cooler or sodas or food on the back floorboard and that kind of stuff So this
was - the luggage that he flew out with was on the back seat so what's in the
trunk is essentially is what that imposes in my mind.
(Tr., p.40, Ls.7-15.) The officer's "articulable fact" - that in his experience travelers put their
luggage in the trunk, with a "cooler or sodas or food" in the backseat - is not a fact from which
criminal activity may reasonably inferred; it simply is not a fact to which any degree of suspicion
can reasonably be attached.
Officer Cottrell also did not sufficiently link his observation of cash in the driver's wallet
to suspicion of criminal activity. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1-2.) The officer testified he thought the cash
was suspicious because it was "fairly common for drug traffickers" and "common in the drug
trafficking industry" to have travel cash (Tr., p.17, Ls. I 0-19), and that "most drivers will use
credit card is my experience" (Tr., p.17, Ls.17-19). However, the officer agreed that, also in his
experience, carrying cash was "not unusual" for people who are traveling from state to state.
(Tr., p.17, Ls.10-13.) Carrying cash is lawful, and for many law-abiding citizens is preferable,
and even according to the officer is not unusual in this circumstance. (Tr., p.17, Ls.10-13.)
Consequently, the fact the driver carried cash in his wallet cannot provide reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity, since too many people fit this description. Cf, Kelley, 160 Idaho at 763
(holding that traveling on a known drug trafficking corridor cannot justify reasonable suspicion
because too many people fit that description).
Officer Cottrell also testified he was suspicious because the driver said he had the legallyrequired documents earlier that same morning.

(Tr., p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.10.) The officer

viewed this statement as suspicious because, based on his training and experience, "in the drug
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trafficking industry" people will check to make sure they have the documents in hand, so if
stopped by police, they "reduce the time that the officer's at the door." (Tr., p.23, Ls.6-10.)
However, this fact, even if consistent with drug traffickers, cannot add to reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity when viewed in the totality of the circumstances presented in this
case. As the driver explained, and as all of the information provided to the officer supports, the
Lexus did not belong to the driver, and he had just picked it up just that morning with the
purpose of driving it across the country. (Ex., at 1: 15-7: 10.) Officer Cottrell testified he had no
reason to disbelieve the driver's explanation. (Tr., p.43, Ls.1-7.) Additionally, Officer Cottrell
testified that, under these circumstances, where a person driving a vehicle that does not belong to
him, he should "absolutely" check the vehicle's registration and insurance documents before
taking it out on the road. (Tr., p.45, Ls.3-14.) Thus, even if the persons involved in the drug
trafficking industry have their own reasons for checking to ensure they have the necessary,
legally-required documents, the fact the driver in this case did so, prior to making the crosscountry trip in his brother's car, does not "indicate something might be wrong." (See Tr., p.46,
Ls.1-5.) Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, the fact the driver had seen the registration
that day can add no degree of suspicion to the reasonable suspicion analysis.
The fact the officer had observed air fresheners clipped to each of the four vents is also
insufficient to create reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances in this case.
Officer Cottrell testified that, "from my experience, when most people put an air freshener in,
they put one or two in." (Tr., p.47, Ls.9-11.) The officer testified, "they don't necessarily put
them in every8 vent" because "that makes it pretty strong inside the vehicle" and is "consistent
with the drug trafficking industry in general." (Tr., p.47, Ls.9-17.) However, even if having
8

A Lexus sedan has four vents. See https://cars.usnews.com/cars-trucks/lexus/es/2016/photosinterior.
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more than two air fresheners is not what "most people do," it is insufficient to provide the
requisite degree of reasonable suspicion. From the beginning of the encounter, Officer Cottrell
was informed that the two men had just picked up the car and were traveling across the country.
Under the totality of these circumstances, the appearance of two extra air fresheners cannot be
viewed as giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.
Nor is a reasonable suspicion supported by Officer Cottrell' s statement that the driver
seemed "evasive" when answering questions. (See Tr., p.9, L.1.) There is no evidence in the
record that supports the officer's statement, certainly not before the time the officer had extended
the stop to interrogate the driver about possible interstate transport of contraband. (See generally
Ex., at 1:00 - 8:25.) On the contrary, the record shows Officer Cottrell had asked the driver
specific questions, including where he picked up the car, who he had been staying with, and
where. (Ex., at 2:20-3:50.) The driver answered all of the officer's questions, without hesitation.
(Ex., at 2:20-3:50.) Thus, even if Officer Cottrell had a subjective feeling that the driver was
being evasive during this period, because that feeling is not supported by the record, it is
irrelevant under the objective totality of the circumstances analysis. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho
804, 811 (2009) (holding that officer's subjective feeling was irrelevant under the objective
totality of the circumstances analysis.)
Likewise, the objective evidence does not support Officer Cottrell's recollection or
opinion that Mr. Mack's "communication" with the officer showed he was "nervous." (Tr., p.10,
Ls.2-8, p.50, Ls.14-15.) Officer Cottrell testified that Mr. Mack had initiated contact with the
officer during a "lull," making an unsolicited greeting, "How are you today, officer?" and then
offering to provide the officer with his ID. (Tr., p.9, 23 -p.10, L.9, p.50, L.14-p.52, Ls.18-24.)
According to Officer Cottrell, "There's a lull in the conversation where [the driver] is looking for
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his documentation and the passenger [Mr. Mack] can't take - to me can't take the silence and so
he turns to me and says, 'How are you today?"' (Tr., p.50, L.24 - p.51, L.3.) Officer Cottrell
said that, based on his training and experience, Mr. Mack's behavior was indicative of
"nervousness." (Tr., p.53, Ls.1-3.) For several reasons, Officer Cottrell's belief that Mr. Mack's
behavior showed "nervousness" does not contribute to the reasonable suspicion analysis.
First, Mr. Mack's purported greeting is not audible on the State's video recording. (See
generally Ex., at 4:40-55.) What the video does show is that, while the driver was looking for

the vehicle's current registration, Officer Cottrell asked what his relationship was with
Mr. Mack. (Ex., at 4:45-50.) The driver identified Mr. Mack as his nephew, and then two
seconds later, Officer Cottrell states, "yeah, if you have it," and Mr. Mack then hands him his ID.
(Ex., at 4:45-50.) Thus, contrary to Officer Cottrell's recollection of the encounter, Mr. Mack's
exchange with him did not take place during a "lull," but occurred in response to the driver
introducing Mr. Mack as his nephew.

(Ex., at 4:50.)

Viewed in its documented context,

Mr. Mack's greeting and offer to provide his ID was entirely appropriate; it was not behavior
indicative of a nervous person who "can't take the silence." Because the objective record does
not support the officer's subjective belief that Mr. Mack was nervous, the officer's subjective
belief is irrelevant. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. 9
In the present case, none of the facts taken alone have significance in the reasonable
suspicion analysis. While it is true that acts consistent with innocent travel, when considered
together, can be sufficiently suspicious to justify an investigative detention, United States v.

9

Additionally, even if Mr. Mack's communication with the officer did show nervousness, as
opposed to Southern politeness, such a fact is of limited significance. See State v. Kelley, 160
Idaho 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2016) (holding "[a] nervous demeanor during an encounter with law
enforcement is of limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion," and
noting it is common for people to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law
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Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989), an investigative detention is not be justified simply because a
traveler's innocent acts are also "consistent with" drug trafficking. The standard is, as always,
whether the totality of the circumstance, that is, the whole picture, support a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.

Taken together, the facts known to Officer Cottrell did not support a

reasonable suspicion, even considering his experience and training, to support his belief that the
vehicle or its occupants were involved in interstate drug trafficking. Like in State v. Neal, "[t]he
sequence of events resembles an experienced officer's 'hunch' that something was out of the
ordinary, but a hunch is not sufficient to meet the stringent requirements of the Fourth
Amendment." 159 Idaho 919, 925 (2016).
At the time Officer Cottrell extended the stop to question the driver about possible
interstate crimes, the objective facts known to him did not support a reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle or its occupants were engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, extending the duration of
the stop was unjustified and violated Mr. Mack's Fourth Amendment rights.

11.

Officer Cottrell Also Lacked Reasonable Suspicion At The Time
He Extended The Stop To Conduct The Dog Sniff

The information available to Officer Cottrell was also insufficient to justify the second
extension of the stop, which was to run the dog sniff. The district court's contrary conclusion
was erroneous.
The only additional information Officer Cottrell possessed was the driver's supposed
reaction after Officer Cottrell stated, "I happen to have a drug detection dog - any reason that
you can think of that the dog would alert - any drugs in the vehicle?" (Tr., p.12, Ls.2-24; Ex., at
8:40-9:07.) Officer Cottrell testified he observed the driver's eyes "widen." (Tr., p.13, L.10.)
He also testified the driver did not verbally answer but shook his head. Tr., p.67, Ls.13-20.)
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According to the officer, this was a "dynamic change" in behavior and, based on the officer's
experience, meant the driver "was aware the dog was likely going to alert on the vehicle."
(Tr., p.67, Ls.13-20.) However, Officer Cottrell is not a mind reader; his testimony about what
the driver was thinking at that moment is purely speculation - not fact, and not a reasonable
inference - and it adds nothing to the reasonable suspicion analysis.
Because Officer Cottrell lacked a sufficient factual basis to support a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity when he extended the stop, the first time (to question the driver),
he likewise lacked a sufficient factual basis to support a reasonable suspicion when he extended
the traffic stop the second time, to conduct the dog sniff The district court's contrary conclusion
was erroneous. Suppression of the evidence should have been granted.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in failing to conclude that the stop was unlawfully prolonged, in
violation of Mr. Mack's Fourth Amendment rights. This Court therefore should reverse the
district court's order denying Mr. Mack's motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction
for marijuana trafficking, and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings to
allow Mr. Mack to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 25 th day of March, 2020.
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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